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Abstract—With the emergence of self-driving technology and
the ever-increasing demand of bandwidth-hungry applications,
providing the required latency, security and computational
capabilities is becoming a challenging task. Although being
evolving, traditional vehicular radio access technologies, namely
WLAN/IEEE 802.11p and cellular networks cannot meet all the
requirements of future Cooperative, Connected and Automated
Mobility (CCAM). In addition, current vehicular architectures
are not sufficiently flexible to support the highly heterogeneous
landscape of emerging communication technologies, such as
mmWave, Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X), and Visible
Light Communication (VLC). To this aim, Multi-access Edge
Computing (MEC) has been recently proposed to enhance the
quality of passengers experience in delay-sensitive applications.
In this paper, we discuss the in-premises features of MEC
and the need of supporting technologies, such as Software
Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization
(NFV), to fulfil the requirements in terms of responsiveness,
reliability and resiliency. The latter is of paramount importance
for automated services, which are supposed to be always-on
and always-available. We outline possible solutions for mobility-
aware computation offloading, dynamic spectrum sharing, and
interference mitigation. Also, by revealing MEC-inherent security
vulnerabilities, we argue for the need of adequate security
and privacy-preserving schemes in MEC-enabled vehicular
architectures.
Index Terms—MEC, URLLC, V2X, SDN/NFV, Security, Pri-
vacy
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent progress on 5G’s Ultra-Reliable and Low-Latency
Communications (URLLC) for connected and Autonomous
Vehicles (AVs) is unlocking new use cases and services, such
as situation-aware driving, self-parking, and Vulnerable Road
User (VRU) detection. In fact, 3GPP identified AVs as one of
the use cases that should be addressed by 5G with the support of
URLLC (1 millisecond end-to-end latency and packet loss rate
as low as 1e-04 are required) [1]. A prerequisite for AVs is the
high perception of their surrounding environment and awareness
of the situation. To this end, AVs rely on a wide constellation
of on-board sensors, but also on remote cloud services, such
as high-definition maps, dynamic path planning, and guided
parking. The main concern in the present vehicular communi-
cation landscape is that these automated driving services are
time-varying, location-dependent, bandwidth-hungry, and delay-
constrained. Automated driving sets very stringent networking
performance requirements in terms of communication delay,
reliability, and capacity to ensure innovative and diverse
services. The most widely adopted Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
networking solutions today are based on Dedicated Short-Range
Communication (DSRC) [2], [3], Long Term Evolution (LTE)
[4], or on heterogeneous approaches that aim at integrating
the advantages from both DSRC and LTE [5], [6]. However,
existing solutions can neither guarantee the end-to-end delay
requirements nor the reliability of these emerging AV services,
especially when considering the intermittent connectivity, high
velocity, and dynamic nature of vehicular networks.
The Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) paradigm is
considered a potential solution towards achieving URLLC in
vehicular networks. MEC was first introduced in 2014 with the
purpose to provide cloud-computing capabilities within Radio
Access Network (RAN) close to the mobile subscribers [7].
The MEC Industry Specification Group (ISG) of the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has provided
the specification for MEC architecture based on use-case-driven
requirements. In its white paper published in December 2017,
the 5G Automotive Association (5GAA) outlined how MEC
technology with its features (i.e., low latency, computation, and
data storage close to end users) can be a supporting technology
for multiple services for connected autonomous driving [8].
Specifically, it highlights several use cases where the use
of MEC is relevant, such as intersection movement assist,
real-time situational awareness, see-through, cooperative lane
change, and VRU discovery. It also evaluates the gap from
already defined MEC features and functions with respect to the
new requirements in terms of new multi-access edge services,
interfaces, and data models.
An ongoing effort recently started by ETSI investigates
innovative mechanisms to support connected cars’ use cases [9].
MEC is considered by ETSI as a fundamental technology
in the 5G ecosystem, not only to ensure URLLC for V2X
communication, but also to deploy services at appropriate
locations [10]. In accordance with ETSI vision, two re-
search projects have been recently launched: the MEC-View
project [11] targets connecting infrastructure sensors to AVs via
a mobile network with pre-processing of object information on
the MEC server; the second project, Car2MEC [12], aims
to improve connectivity for safety applications by taking
advantage of local processing capability of MEC servers and
the combination of ad-hoc and infrastructure-based networks.
However, before embracing the MEC paradigm, a number
of challenges have to be addressed. In particular, resiliency
is a paramount concern for automated services, which are
supposed to be always-on and always-available. MEC-enabled
architectures must be able to adapt and dynamically react to
node failures and communication link deterioration. Also, the
plethora of wireless communication technologies in vehicular
networks and the possibility to gain access to MEC servers
and hence to rich-context information, create serious security
and privacy concerns.
In this position paper, we focus on the soaring need to
provide URLLC V2X communications for seamless access to
automated driving services by exploiting the MEC paradigm,
as well as other 5G-enabling technologies, such as Software
Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualiza-
tion (NFV). We argue that leveraging on the emerging MEC
paradigm will enable the development of innovative solutions
for 5G automotive systems. We also discuss security and privacy
implications of moving the traditional cloud close to the edges
of the network, as well as the need for new privacy-preserving
techniques in MEC-enabled vehicular architectures. Finally, we
claim that resilient mechanisms for V2X communications under
interactions with various access technologies are necessary.
II. MEC IN VEHICULAR NETWORKS: A BROAD OVERVIEW
MEC is considered an enabler for URLLC within the
context of Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility
(CCAM). The main idea behind the MEC paradigm is to
bring a cloud computing environment at the edge of the
network and in proximity to the end-users. This can be
done by coupling MEC servers with the existing network
infrastructure, i.e., Base Stations (BSs), Road Side Units
(RSUs), and other Access Points (APs). By integrating IT
services and telecommunications networking, MEC enables the
evolution of the mobile BSs and triggers the rapid deployment
of innovative services and applications. The general MEC
concept is based on a distributed pool of servers and resources
able to process content and to provide proximity services.
Currently, there is no common agreement on how the MEC-
enabled vehicular architecture for CCAM should look like.
ETSI has defined a MEC framework where several MEC servers
are implemented at the BSs [13]. Recent studies have proposed
MEC-enabled architectures for V2X use cases [14]–[17]. While
some studies have adopted the same architecture designed by
ETSI, namely BSs or RSUs co-located with MEC servers [14],
other assume edge servers being located between the core
network and BSs [15]. Hence, they are deployed independently
from the radio network elements. Other studies consider
vehicles as edge servers connected to Evolved NodeBs (eNBs)
through two-tier architecture [16]. The first tier is directly
connected to the eNB and is responsible of content caching,
data aggregation, and analysis. The connection to the eNB is
carried out by a cluster head using licensed Sub-6 GHz link.
The second tier is connected to the cluster head of the first tier
via mmWave links.
Figure 1 depicts an example of a high-level MEC-enabled
architecture for CCAM with different use-cases. The first
use-case, namely platooning, describes a scenario in which
a group of vehicles are coordinated to drive together with
very small inter-vehicle distance and without human control.
A platoon is usually coordinated by a platoon leader (i.e.,
the heading vehicle), who is in charge of deciding the main
platoon configuration (e.g., inter-vehicle distance, platoon size,
driving speed, etc.), by means of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
communication. A MEC-enabled CCAM architecture providing
URLLC can improve platoon applications by minimizing the
shock-wave effects and improving the platoon stability [18].
Additionally, such an architecture can enable the deployment
of autonomous vehicular highway systems, where platoons can
be remotely controlled and managed by traffic management op-
erators. For instance, Huang et al. [18] use MEC technology to
achieve real-time computing/processing in-proximity of platoon
members and to allocate virtual machines instances of diverse
applications to the platoon. Moreover, given that in a platoon
vehicles are evolving in the same environment, Ferdowsi et al.
[19] proposed that vehicles should collaboratively learn a shared
prediction model while keeping all of the training data on their
own. This can be achieved through collaborative edge analytics,
such as federated learning. Hence vehicles forming the platoon
are decoupled from cloud and less data is generated inside the
platoon.
The second use-case is collaborative networking. This latter
can be carried out at different levels (e.g., Physical, MAC,
Routing/ Forwarding) [20]. For instance, instead of using
multiple antennas to achieve spatial diversity, neighbouring
vehicles cooperate among themselves to enhance the reliability
of a message by transmitting it through different communication
channels. In this way, the obtained performances are similar
to what is achieved by conventional MIMO systems. Space
diversity can be also achieved at the routing layer by using
cooperative routing protocols among nodes along the route. Hu
et al. [16] integrate different V2X technologies (licensed Sub-
6 GHz, IEEE 802.11p, and mmWave) to improve the content
distribution and processing in vehicular networks. To this
end, they developed a hierarchical MEC-enabled architecture
composed of two different types of vehicular edges: tier-1 edges
for data caching and aggregation, and tier-2 edges for data
analysis. The presence of MEC servers close to the edge of the
network enhances computation and processing capabilities of
the network infrastructure. However, the computation time
needed to execute certain tasks on a MEC server can be
higher than the direct connectivity time of a vehicle with
that server. Collaborative networking has been identified as
a potential solution for predictive task offloading, where
computation tasks can be relayed by means of multi-hop inter-
vehicle communication [21]. Finally, collaborative networking
improves situation awareness [20]. In this context, a MEC-based
architecture can help to prevent accidents by signalling collision
warnings faster because of URLLC capabilities. This can
provide real-time alerts to vehicles in a local area. Additionally,
it can deliver information about free parking space in-proximity
which saves time and emissions.
The last use-case in Figure 1 is VRU safety. In this use-case






































Figure 1. An example of MEC-enabled architecture with three use cases: (1) platooning, (2) collaborative networking and (3) VRU safety.
vicinity, such as pedestrians, cyclists, people with disabilities,
and can signal cross-walk warnings to all approaching vehicles.
Additionally, applications that allow vehicles themselves to
send warning messages to VRUs, by means of Vehicle-to-
Pedestrian (V2P) communication, can be developed. This can
significantly improve the safety for VRUs. In this regard,
MEC can play a key role by exploiting the local context
and collected information to propose suitable manoeuvres in
a timely manner. Recently, MEC ETSI group released a first
set of APIs (Radio Network information, Location APIs, etc.)
to improve the accuracy of the positioning information of
all traffic participants [8]. Despite the advantages of MEC
technology, there are several research challenges that needs to
be addressed by the research community.
III. RESEARCH CHALLENGES IN MEC-ENABLED
VEHICULAR NETWORKS
This section describes the open research challenges that are
important to solve and to make MEC-enabled heterogeneous
vehicular networks ready for CCAM.
RC 1 URLLC, seamless connectivity and resiliency
Many existing and emerging AV applications, such
as safety, platooning, or Advanced Driver-Assistance
Systems (ADAS), are only possible if URLLC among
neighbouring vehicles and between vehicles and the
infrastructure is guaranteed. Current V2X communica-
tion systems, namely IEEE 802.11p, Cellular Vehicle-
to-Everything (C-V2X), mmWave, or Visible Light
Communication (VLC), are normally used to obtain
an enhanced perception of the surrounding environment.
However, none of these communication technologies is
able to fully satisfy latency and reliability requirements
of AV applications. In addition, 5G networks envision
deploying a large number of small cells to satisfy the
seamless coverage. Consequently, a vehicle engaged
in V2X communications and travelling across multiple
cells needs to frequently perform horizontal and vertical
handover procedures. It is crucial for some V2X applica-
tions to maintain the service continuity while performing
seamless handover. Subsequently, resilient collaborative
networking schemes are of paramount importance.
RC 2 Resources Management & Orchestration
5G networks are extremely heterogeneous (different
communication technologies and mobile operators) and
hence deploying resources and services at the edge of the
network and in-proximity of end-users is too complex
to manage. It is challenging to meet the Quality of
Service (QoS) requirements (delay, throughput, etc.)
and seamless service delivery without sophisticated
resources management and orchestration schemes. V2X
use cases will be a main part of the Mobile Network
Operators (MNOs) targeted services and, therefore,
they will face the challenge of orchestrating all their
edges nodes to support new vertical segments (e.g.,
CCAM, industry4.0, public safety) in a single network
infrastructure. These edge nodes are geographically
distributed and will need standard-driven solution with
reusing assets.
RC 3 Cooperative Awareness
A typical communication paradigm in vehicular net-
works consists in every vehicle periodically broadcasting
Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs), containing
basic state information, such as speed, location, driving
direction, etc. This information must be shared among
neighboring vehicles in order to enhance knowledge
about the surrounding environment. Vehicles can cooper-
ate either via V2V or Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I). A
reliable and low-latency exchange of such information
is crucial for the operation of most vehicular safety
applications. However, the heterogeneous nature of
vehicular networks, i.e., the presence of multiple on-
board vehicular communication technologies, makes
this operation quite challenging. In addition, AVs are
expected to push a large number of heavy computational
tasks to edge nodes. Although these nodes are powerful,
most of them do not offer the required capacity to carry
out these tasks within the predefined QoS requirements
of critical V2X uses cases where high reliability and
low latency are of paramount importance.
RC 4 Heterogeneity & Interferences
Various heterogeneous wireless access technologies
will exist in 5G vehicular networks sharing network
infrastructures and spectrum resources. Given the high-
mobility of vehicles, intermittent nature of V2X links,
randomness in channel dynamics, and link interferences,
this can lead to low Quality of Experience (QoE)
of vehicle users and waste of the scarce spectrum
resources. While MNOs are deploying small cells (e.g.,
Femto, Micro, Pico), interferences mitigation among
tiers becomes extremely crucial due to the heterogeneity
of networks. Therefore, how to provide resiliency
for V2X applications and dynamic spectrum sharing
solutions with URLLC requirement using the existing or
future vehicular networks has become a major challenge.
For instance, mmWave presents inherent propagation
characteristics that need new solutions for spectrum
sharing in 5G vehicular networks based on the context
of the AVs and services’ requirements.
RC 5 Security & Privacy
Road users determine their own positions with Global
Positioning System (GPS) or Dead Reckoning and
broadcast their position to their neighbourhood. A
malicious vehicle can easily broadcast forged location
information and create a huge amount of damage. In
this scenario, MEC could help to be a trusted entity and
verify the location of each participant. Additionally, one
of the principles of the MEC paradigm is that cloud
computing capabilities are only provided to users in
close proximity. A research challenge remains how an
edge server can verify the location of the users in order
to countermeasure the above mentioned attacks.
Since MEC-enabled architectures are quite new, inves-
tigation of security and privacy vulnerabilities is still
nascent. Only few studies have analysed these threats.
Shirazi et al. [22] and Roman et al. [23] summarized the
security threats that can target the network infrastructure,
edge data centre, core infrastructure, virtualisation
infrastructure, and user devices. Attacks such as Denial-
of-Service (DoS) can be carried out against the network
infrastructure (e.g. Radio Frequency (RF) jamming), but
also against the virtualized infrastructure. Rogue hard-
and software could run in the gateway, edge data center
and core infrastructure and hence an attacker is able
to run Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. Both studies
outline that privacy leakages can take place in the edge
data centre, virtualized infrastructure and the user device
itself.
Privacy is another crucial requirement for V2X com-
munications and is currently solved with pseudonym
schemes [24], [25]. The introduction of multiple access
technologies in a MEC-enabled environment, however,
increases the amount of physical information that can be
used to create a unique fingerprint of a user, which can
be used for tracking [26], [27]. Consequently, revealing
the security challenges introduced by MEC-enabled
platforms and proposing adequate countermeasures is
mandatory. In addition, the capability of MEC nodes to
store and analyse data, and execute complex computa-
tions, makes them attractive candidates for security at-
tacks. Therefore, privacy-preserving schemes are needed,
given that rich context-information is processed by MEC
servers and malicious users or third-party stakeholders
can gain access to edge servers and derive information
regarding users in proximity.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In this section, we discuss potential solutions to the research
challenges that we have described in Section III.
To address RC 1, a constellation of different communication
technologies and links can be exploited. In particular, V2X
communication systems include different information exchange
paths: V2I, Vehicle-to-Network (V2N), V2P and V2V. MEC
servers can help in selecting the best signalling path and
the most suitable communication technology among the once
available in order to ensure the most reliable and low-latency
communication link. The multitude and variety of commu-
nication paths and technologies allows having backup links,
which improves resiliency and provides seamless connectivity.
Moreover, caching services and mobility prediction mechanisms
can be implemented on the MEC servers side in order the
guarantee resource and information availability in advance,
which will improve URLLC, connectivity and resiliency.
A MEC-enabled architecture for CCAM requires coordi-
nation, management, and orchestration to use the resources
efficiently, as pointed out in RC 2. Leveraging on the recent
advances on SDN along with NFV, the two key 5G components,
MEC could significantly improve the resource management
and orchestration. Although there are some recent studies
that have focused on integrating these technologies in the
MEC architecture [17], [28], [29], the full potential of SDN
and NFV is still to be discovered. RC 2 challenges can be
tackled by concentrating the network intelligence at distributed
software-based controllers. In this way, SDN can relieve edge
devices from the burden of complex operation. At the same
time, NFV comes to help by allowing network functions
to be dynamically deployed and inter-connected. Thus, it
is mandatory to conceptualize the 5G reference framework
by integrating SDN and NFV with MEC and introduce a
programmable, flexible, and controllable architecture that can
meet the requirements of selected uses cases for CCAM [30].
Deployment of SDN controllers and Virtualized Network
Function (VNF) instances should take into account traffic
characteristics, wireless diversity (link quality, link correlation,
etc.) and mobility pattern. Including these technologies in the
MEC architecture will enable 5G-like functionalities over the
existing 4G infrastructure.
To address the challenges in RC 3, MEC servers could
periodically collect data from vehicles related to the presence
of different communication technologies on-board. Based on
this information, the edge network will be used to create
connectivity graphs, which will be periodically disseminated
to vehicles and other road users, in order to enhance their
knowledge about available on-board communication technolo-
gies and to improve vehicles’ awareness. All this information
exchange process in heterogeneous vehicular network must
be efficiently coordinated. Compared to a resourceful cloud, a
MEC server has limited resources. Operating alone, a MEC
server cannot handle the burden of computation caching
offloading from multiple AVs. To solve RC 3, we propose
a dynamic orchestration of tasks computing and caching taking
into account MEC-to-MEC communication and popularity
patterns of computing tasks over large set of MEC servers.
SDN and NFV could also be combined to enable dynamic
orchestration of computing resources in order to enhance
cooperative awareness. Deep reinforcement learning techniques
could be investigated to obtain efficient resource-allocation
policies.
RC 4 argues that radio spectrum is increasingly scarce, par-
ticularly in the “propagation-friendly” sub-6 GHz range. IEEE
802.11p-based ITS-G5 and 3GPP LTE-based C-V2X are the
two major technologies competing for adoption in large-scale
V2X deployment and the corresponding allocated frequency
bands. Moreover, there are other incumbent services, such as
Short Range Devices (SRD) and Fixed Wireless Access (FWA),
operating in the same band. Harmful interference between these
systems could have fatal consequences as pointed out in RC 4.
To solve this issue, effective spectrum sharing mechanisms are
necessary and therefore, it is necessary to study coexistence
conditions between the different systems, in particular between
ITS-G5 and C-V2X, and propose coexistence mechanisms
or/and interference mitigation techniques. In a V2X system,
dynamic spectrum maps could be generated utilizing miscel-
laneous data supplied from both mobile and fixed nodes and
applying machine-learning techniques for data analysis. Such
spectrum maps can be explored and, in combination with
mobility models, employed to design a location-based dynamic
spectrum access scheme for heterogeneous wireless vehicular
networks.
An important aspect to be investigated is how MEC servers
can act as trusted entities to provide accurate and trustworthy
location information to road users, which we mentioned in
RC 5. A possible solution is to use a Distance Bounding
Protocol (DBP) [31], a cryptographic protocol which measures
the signal propagation delay in order to verify the location of
road users. However, since there are a number of DBPs and
communication technologies which could be used, an evaluation
is needed. Because the foundation of DBP is to measure the
signal propagation delay, it is also mandatory to investigate
appropriate techniques (e.g. invert non-uniform discrete Fourier
transformation) to mitigate the multi-path problem inherent to
DBP. Another not-well addressed security aspect from RC 5 is
the vulnerability of MEC-enabled V2X systems to DoS attacks
such as jamming, RF-based attacks, eavesdropping, and MitM
attacks, taking into account recent advances in Software-defined
Radio (SDR) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology
which enable more sophisticated attacks on mobile targets. A
possible solution to this problem is the usage of Frequency
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) [32], a method in which the
communication partners (AVs) changing the carrier frequency
rapidly according to a pseudo-random scheme known to them.
This makes it harder for the attacker, because the frequency
must be known in order to jam it. Wide frequency jamming is
technically a lot harder to do. Another possible solution is the
usage of a new spread spectrum technique, such as Bandwidth
Hopping Spread Spectrum (BHSS) [33]. In this technique, the
transmitter randomly hopping the signal bandwidth to hamper
the jamming attack.
As highlighted in RC 5, privacy-preserving V2X communica-
tions is a great concern for road users. Currently, in V2X, this
problem is solved with pseudonymity schemes. However, the
providers of the edge server could collect physical information
from the multiple access technologies to create a unique end-
user fingerprint, which then could be used for tracking. The
authors of [34], [35] have shown that even physical information
such as Channel State Information (CSI) of a wireless device are
enough to create a unique fingerprint. Such investigations are
needed for all access technologies used by the MEC architecture
to protect users’ privacy. It is important to investigate which
physical information (e.g. phase shifting, amplitude, number
of antennas, etc.) can be collected from the multiple access
technologies. Appropriate machine-learning algorithms can
be used to create unique device fingerprints. Based on these
investigations, adequate countermeasures need to be developed
to harden fingerprint generation.
V. CONCLUSION
The rapid proliferation of connected cars and self-driving
technology is posing severe demands on cloud infrastructure
and vehicular access networks. Stringent requirements in terms
of latency, reliability and seamless service delivery are calling
for placing highly localized intelligence in close proximity
to vehicle users. In light of this, this paper focused on the
emerging MEC paradigm, considered as a key technology that
can fulfil the requirements of future vehicular networks. MEC
is considered by ETSI as a cornerstone for the execution of
several delay-sensitive V2X use cases. However, the research on
MEC-enabled vehicular networks is still in its early stage and
therefore, a panoply of research challenges need to be addressed.
Accordingly, we have outlined several research challenges that
need to be taken into account when designing future MEC-
enabled vehicular networks. Then, we highlighted potential
solutions for resources management, low-latency computation
and security using 5G key technologies.
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